Once again, Moscow is suspending mobile internet during Victory Day celebrations on May 9^th due to concerns about attacks from Ukrainian drones connected to and controlled via Russian mobile networks. This would not be the first time Ukraine has used mobile networks to connect drones, nor is it the first time mobile internet has been shut down for fear of Ukrainian attacks. However, suspending critical infrastructure services comes at a high price. The question we need to ask is if there is a way to avoid blanket shutdowns while preserving security.

Moscow’s Victory Day Internet Shutdowns

In the run-up to Victory Day 2025, there were repeated reports of Ukrainian drones targeting Moscow and the surrounding region. Russian officials claimed drones were intercepted near the capital on consecutive nights and airports were temporarily closed. Those attacks were reported as part of a broader wave of Ukrainian UAV strikes across Russia, and they helped drive heightened security measures ahead of the May 9 parade, including suspending mobile Internet.

Victory Day is significant to Putin’s regime as a key symbol of legitimacy. It connects the current Russian regime to the Soviet WWII victory, stirs patriotism, and presents current conflicts as a continuation of the struggle against “Nazis” and external enemies. Additionally, it provides the Kremlin with a major platform to showcase military strength and national solidarity.

During the celebrations, there is a genuine risk of attacks directly targeting the Russian leadership or other important assets. However, a Ukrainian strike in the country’s core on an especially symbolic day would be a humiliation the Kremlin would want to avoid at all costs. Or as Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, expressed it: “any real provocation on Victory Day will have consequences for Kyiv, and no one guarantees that May 10 will come in Kyiv.”

Security at a Cost

However, deciding to suspend mobile internet is undoubtedly difficult, even in Russia. The effects are far-reaching, though not as dramatic as a major drone attack.

From Moscow, it is being reported that the mobile internet shutdowns are causing problems with everything from processing card payments and using ATMs to using taxi services and online maps. Russian authorities have tried to minimize the damage by whitelisting some local services. This has not resolved the problem, as evidently many whitelisted sites still fail to work in major cities. In fact, some residents also report having been cut off from voice calls and SMS services, not only mobile internet. This may indicate that the Russian authorities fear Ukrainian drones could use mobile infrastructure in ways other than connecting over the Internet (for example, passively using cell towers for navigation). If all network services are suspended, the implications become even more serious, as it will also affect emergency services, not just everyday life.

Even without critical service disruptions, the cumulative effect of all minor issues, system and economic disruptions, and the frustration felt by everyday people is substantial. Our heavy reliance on mobile technology today means that when it fails, society grinds to a halt.

Recurring mobile service shutdowns might have taught Moscow’s residents how to cope with the situation, but that doesn’t mean they approve of it. In tightly controlled Russia, protesting against the regime and its decisions can be dangerous, and many Russians choose to look the other way. However, there are still ways for Russians to express their dissatisfaction and frustration with internet shutdowns. In one such action, citizens were encouraged to submit petitions against the shutdowns. Such protests show that the friction caused by regular mobile internet suspensions is significant and breeds discontent.

Herein lies the challenge for any nation trying to counter drones using local mobile internet. It becomes a trade-off between risking damage from drone attacks and risking damage from a shutdown. Over time, repeated shutdowns may be the most damaging, as they will significantly erode trust and harm the economy, and there are alternative ways to protect against drones.

A Better Approach to Mobile-Enabled Drone Threats

There has to be a better way than indiscriminately denying internet access to all mobile subscribers, one that can identify mobile-connected drones from other users and disconnect only those identified as hostile. The problem is detecting which data traffic is generated by hostile drone activity in the massive flow of data from all users, including the legitimate ones. This is an area that Enea has been researching lately.

Enea recently released a research report examining how mobile technology has been used in drone communication during the war in Ukraine. The report includes recommendations for developing a framework that can not only detect drones within mobile networks but also selectively disconnect them from their communications, all while preserving service for other users. We identified six potential countermeasures through which hostile drones could connect to mobile networks, each with its own advantages and disadvantages.

1. Shutting down the entire mobile network country-wide
2. Shutting down mobile internet country-wide
3. Permanent service suspensions in selected areas
4. Temporary service suspensions in selected areas
5. Blocking specific SIM cards or devices
6. Block subscribers based on their network activity.

Russia seems to be mostly focused on temporary service suspensions in selected areas where they assess the risks are big enough to justify the action. It makes sense, as it is the least damaging action given a lack of more refined options.

Our report’s conclusion, which aligns with the European Commission’s stance, is that selectively blocking specific users based on their network activity is the preferred approach. The key challenge is to accurately identify drones among all network users. Enea holds a unique position here due to its expertise in network security, optimization, and traffic analytics. The technology required to develop a smart drone defense system that uses network data to detect and counteract hostile drones already exists. Moving forward, authorities, mobile operators, and vendors like Enea need to collaborate to develop and implement effective solutions that can counter mobile-connected drones in mobile networks without causing collateral damage.

Read the full report here: Riders on the Cellular Storm – Mobile Connected UAVs in Conflict